C

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

September 1, 1943

What Future for Japan?

BY LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

PUBLISHED TWICE A MONTH BY THE

Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated

MIDSTON HOUSE, 22 EAST 38th STREET, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOLUME XIX NUMBER 12 25¢ *a copy* $5.00 *a year*

What Future for Japan?

BY LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

AT present the chief objective of the United Nations in Asia is to defeat Japan. But the day is slowly approaching when victory in battle will bring the world face to face with the problems of peace in the Pacific. Even if the Japanese islands then pass through a period of military occupation, the weapons of war cannot of themselves produce a new Far East. Reconstruction will require steps toward the adjustment of economic and political difficulties not only in Japan but throughout the far-flung region of which it forms a part. Nor can the future of Asia be one of peaceful progress if the West is in turmoil. Inevitably the East will have an increasingly powerful voice in shaping its own development, but the forces it generates will not operate in isolation. There will be the closest interaction with influences stemming from other parts of the world, especially from the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union.

Much of Japan's strength has derived from skillful use of the differences among its foes. To return to that situation would be to guarantee the recurrence of war. It may therefore be taken as axiomatic that only the closest association among the United Nations can make possible enlightened and effective post-war action in Asia. It is to be expected that in so varied a coalition disagreements will arise but, if the dangers of disunity are clearly understood, the victorious powers will not allow their policies to be distorted by fear of their partners' strength. Were the United States, for example, seriously disturbed at the prospect of dealing with a stable, independent China after the defeat of Japan, our military efforts today as well as our role in the post-war world would be gravely weakened. It is doubtful whether we would have the will to destroy Japanese militarism root and branch, knowing that we would thereby remove the greatest single external check on China's development. A similar situation would exist if we were obsessed by fears of Soviet or British power in Asia.

These fears are not paramount for most Americans. But it is necessary to go further and to recognize that the United States has a positive interest in the modernization of China and other Far Eastern territories—apart from the markets and opportunities for investment that may be found there. Since the economic, political and therefore military weakness of neighboring peoples has been a primary factor in Japanese domination of Asia, few measures could be more effective in ending Japanese aggression than the development of the surrounding territories. This situation is especially striking because Japan, unlike Germany, does not hold an inherently powerful position. Given adequate industrial facilities, India and China could outstrip Japan in almost every field of economic endeavor; while the vast region from Burma to the Indies and Philippines would be capable of enormous economic advances. It is possible, of course, that some new Far Eastern power may itself become aggressive, but wise statesmanship on the part of other nations can do much to prevent this. Certainly there is no prospect of peace in attempts to thwart Asia's modernization. The main question is whether it will occur with us or against us.

Peace with Japan cannot be dictated by the United States, but must be a joint peace of the United Nations. The views of China, which has fought longer than any other power against Japan, and of Britain, which has been at war in the Pacific as long as we have and has suffered far greater material losses in that region, must receive the fullest consideration. This is also true of the opinions of the Soviet Union—even if it remains formally at peace with Japan—for it will have played a major role in the defeat of the Axis as a whole and will be deeply interested in the future of Asia. And the same principles hold for other members of the United Nations located in Asia or with interests in that area. Peace can hardly be lasting in the Far East unless it is the product of concerted agreement.

Genuine agreement depends, however, on common understanding of what is meant by Japan's "unconditional surrender," since these words have a precise meaning only if taken in a military sense. The nature of Japan's defeat will be determined not only by the decisiveness of the fighting, but by the extent to which the peace promotes the eradication of Japanese militarism. It is not difficult

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, VOLUME XIX, NUMBER 12, SEPTEMBER 1, 1943

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y., U.S.A. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President;* SHERMAN S. HAYDEN, *Assistant to the President;* VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor and Research Director;* HELEN TERRY, *Assistant Editor. Research Associates:* WINIFRED N. HADSEL, ERNEST S. HEDIGER, HELEN H. MOORHEAD, ONA K. D. RINGWOOD, LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER, HOWARD P. WHIDDEN, JR. Subscription Rates: $5.00 a year; to F.P.A. members $3.00; single copies 25 cents. Entered as second-class matter on March 31, 1931 at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.

to imagine that Japan might yield after being beaten in a most telling way on the battlefield, yet become a military threat within a few years because of the inadequacy of the peace. Nor is it unthinkable that the Japanese may offer to surrender at a time when they retain considerable military strength but recognize that the general outlook is hopeless. The object of such a move would be, in effect, to secure better terms and to end the war before Japan's internal economic and political system was shaken to its foundations. It would be an effort to make the best of a bad situation and to appeal to such tendencies toward appeasement as may remain in Britain and the United States.

Many commentators have therefore warned against a false peace with Japan on the ground that it would be nothing more than an armistice between wars.[1] This does not mean that the battle should continue even though Tokyo is willing to yield, but that peace can hardly be lasting unless it involves no compromise with the groups in Japan responsible for the war. One writer defines "conclusive defeat" as meaning that Japan must never again be able to seek empire over China and the Indies.[2] Another suggests that "Japan must be not only defeated but crushed—maimed and left helpless, beyond possibility of recovery for a long period."[3] A third—formerly United States Ambassador in Tokyo—declares, with different emphasis: "The Japanese people cannot be exterminated, no matter how extreme was the folly of their leaders. The Japanese people must achieve the freedom of civilized men and must take their role in the comity of nations."[4] But, whatever the terms in which the broad purposes of the United Nations are expressed, success will depend on the answers that are given to various concrete questions.

SHOULD JAPAN BE DISARMED?

If the war should end with the creation by the Japanese people of a genuinely non-militaristic government bent on wiping out the sources of militarism in Japanese life, a very strong case would exist for allowing the new administration to regulate its own armaments instead of having formal disarmament imposed upon it. Since such a régime would itself be the best possible guarantee against future Japanese aggression, it would not be in our interest to do anything that might make its position at home more difficult. But, regardless of our desire to see such a situation develop, it is prudent to assume that, in a country with so deep-seated a militaristic tradition, the most that can be expected at the beginning is the development of a serious struggle against militarism with the issue remaining in doubt for some time to come. In this event it will probably be wise for us, as well as helpful to the peaceful elements in Japan, if the United Nations take technical steps to prevent an early renewal of war. But what would this involve?

Article 8 of the Atlantic Charter calls for the disarmament of aggressors. This, according to a Chinese observer, probably should mean the surrender of Japan's remaining fleet, air force, and artillery, as well as the destruction of naval bases and fortifications.[5] Another Chinese writer, who would permit a few warships for police and customs purposes as well as some land forces to maintain internal order, suggests that a permanent international commission supervise these limited armaments.[6] On the other hand, while declaring that Tokyo should surrender its war materials and dismantle its arsenals, a British student asks whether disarmament may not—as in the case of Germany after 1918—give Japan a considerable commercial advantage by relieving it of the burden of military production.[7] And an American author who believes that Japan cannot be disarmed permanently points out that it will be very difficult to tell whether steel mills or automobile plants are intended for civilian or military purposes.[8]

In judging the desirability of disarming Japan, the United Nations will, of course, consider the possible results of such a move. Disarmament cannot be expected of itself to make Japan a peaceful nation. However important arms may be as the means of war, it is generally recognized that they are not the cause of aggression. It is also doubtful whether Japan can be disarmed indefinitely, if only because no nation that possesses a powerful industry and spirit of nationalism is likely in the long run to remain in an inferior position. Moreover, disarmament can only be partial in character—designed to prevent attacks abroad—since no Japanese government will be able to maintain itself in the difficult post-war period unless it has armed forces adequate to keep peace at home. The only alternative is the indefinite military occupation of Japan or, what is

1. Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York, Knopf, 1942), pp. 339-41.

2. Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1943), p. 144.

3. Nathaniel Peffer, *Basis for Peace in the Far East* (New York, Harper, 1942), p. 56.

4. Joseph C. Grew, *Report from Tokyo: A Message to the American People* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1942), p. 87.

5. Hu Shih, *Two Papers on Post-War Asia* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942, mimeographed), p. 8.

6. S. R. Chow, "The Pacific After the War," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), October 1942, pp. 72-73.

7. George B. Sansom, *Postwar Relations with Japan* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942, mimeographed), p. 2.

8. Peffer, *Basis for Peace*, cited, pp. 135-36.

essentially the same thing, the complete dependence of a Japanese puppet régime on foreign bayonets. Neither of these presents an encouraging prospect for the future. Furthermore, while it is desirable to limit Japan's arms, it is even more important to destroy the existing structure of the Japanese Army and Navy, replacing these organizations with forces having a different purpose, a non-militaristic background, and a new leadership.

On the other hand, these considerations do not prove that *temporary disarmament,* which would keep Japan's armed forces at a level inadequate for aggression, would be an unwise policy. It might, in fact, give the Far East a period of time for peaceful development and weaken the militarists in Japan. It is worth noting here that, despite the Weimar Republic's evasions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany remained effectively disarmed until the rise of Hitler and that even then a strong combination of opposing powers might have prevented the Nazis from waging war. This suggests two conclusions: disarmament in itself need not be ineffective as a technical measure, but the nature of the Japanese government after the war and the degree of United Nations unity against renewed Japanese aggression will be the ultimately determining factors.

If the problem is viewed in a broader setting, there is yet a third point: disarmament of Japan will be most likely to succeed if, after a time, all nations agree to a plan for general limitation of armaments and international inspection of the arms of each country. This would remove from Japan the stigma of being in a subordinate position and would indicate that measures for its own temporary, partial disarmament were not simply of a punitive character. In the last analysis, the continuance of peace in East Asia can hardly be guaranteed without a sound system of collective security which, if effective at the beginning in checking aggressors, could finally lead to the gradual disarmament of all parties by agreement.

SHOULD JAPAN'S INDUSTRY BE DESTROYED?

The fact that no highly industrialized country is likely to remain disarmed permanently has led one commentator to suggest the complete destruction of Japanese industry, "so that not one brick of any Japanese factory shall be left upon another, so that there shall not be in Japan one electric motor or one steam or gasoline engine, nor a chemical laboratory, nor so much as a book which tells how these things are made."[9] Another advocates the demolition of Japan's "war industries, heavy industries and machine-building industry," or their transfer to devastated areas in Asia as reparation. Japanese light industry would be limited to production for civilian use, preventing quick recovery of the country's military power.[10] A third writer, approaching the question from a different angle, declares that in the prosecution of the war we must destroy the main Japanese cities and the Japanese industrial machine from the air, in order to teach Japan a lesson, prevent it from considering new plans of conquest for a long time to come, and perhaps give it an opportunity to develop "a new temper."[11]

Indeed, it is probable that a significant number of enemy factories will have been bombed before fighting ceases, thereby throwing Japan back some years in its economic development. But it does not appear likely that the Japanese will—or can—hold out until the major part of their industrial plant has been blown up. Their defeat will probably come much before that, leaving them with a considerable degree of machine power. In these circumstances, it would seem wise for the United Nations to allow Japan to retain its entire remaining industry.

To do otherwise would be to condemn many millions of Japanese to starvation and death. When the country's economy was purely agricultural it supported a rather stable population of from twenty-eight to thirty million people; the addition of more than forty million in less than a century has been made possible only by the growth of industry and foreign trade. The destruction of all industry, or even the major part of it, would force Japan to resort to older, inadequate means of livelihood, under conditions of indescribable chaos. The result of this effort to exterminate a major portion of the Japanese nation could only be to bind the Japanese people irrevocably to their militarists and to fill the country with an undying hatred of its present enemies. If successful, the policy would make Japan a colony and subject it to an enslavement far worse than it is now visiting on its own conquered territories. This is at variance with any sound program for destroying Japanese militarism and developing a peaceful Japanese society.

It does not follow that some limitations may not be placed on Japanese industry for a period. If Japan is partially disarmed, it will be forbidden to produce tanks, military planes, naval vessels and other instruments of war on a significant scale. Supervision of the output of Japanese industry may

9. George Fielding Eliot, *New York Herald Tribune,* April 23, 1943.

10. Sun Fo, "A Chinese Plan to Beat Japan Now," *New York Times,* July 11, 1943.

11. Peffer, *Basis for Peace,* cited, pp. 72-73.

therefore be necessary, perhaps through the operation of United Nations commissions. But it would be unwise for the United Nations to consider such a situation permanent or to allow their actions to be influenced by motives of revenge or the desire to remove a commercial competitor. Not only would Allied agreement on this type of program be unlikely, even if some voices were raised in its favor; but, in the logic of events, a policy of forcing the Japanese into a colonial position would hardly be accompanied by early moves toward the independence of colonial Asia or the establishment of a modern China—steps which are necessary for a peaceful Far East.[12]

SHOULD UNITED NATIONS CONTROL JAPAN'S FOREIGN TRADE?

If Japan is not to go through mass starvation by being compelled to return to an agricultural economy, and is to be forbidden for a time to manufacture armaments freely, then its main economic alternative is to concentrate on the production of consumption goods to be sold within Japan and overseas. For reasons peculiar to Japanese history, the home market has been extremely narrow and, under the best of circumstances, is not likely to expand to any considerable extent on the morrow of defeat. Foreign markets will therefore be more important than ever to Japanese industry. Japan is also extraordinarily dependent on imports of raw materials for its factories and to a lesser degree on certain agricultural imports for food. After the war this dependence can be expected to increase, since the entire overseas empire will have been lost. Soy beans from Manchuria, sugar from Formosa, and rice from conquered territories—to mention only the agricultural items—will then have to be paid for either in commodities shipped under barter agreements, or in gold—not yen as at present. Barter itself means the right to trade, while gold can be secured only through the sale of Japanese goods abroad. It is obvious that if Japan cannot import and export, it cannot live.

On the other hand, the United Nations have reason to be concerned about Japanese foreign trade, for imports of essential raw materials, principally from the United States, helped Tokyo to prepare for war. The Allied powers may find it desirable, as an alternative to supervising Japanese industry, to establish "scientific and judicious control" of Japan's imports of essential materials during the period of disarmament. This is a policy that can be especially effective because of Japan's internal shortages of vital mineral products.[13] Purchases of these articles could be restricted to the amounts necessary for the production of civilian goods and of such arms as are permitted.

There would, however, be no reason to prevent Japan from selling commodities abroad, or from securing the raw materials required for this production. Japanese trade can play a significant role in the reconstruction of Asia, especially in meeting the needs of low-price markets not adequately supplied by the industries of other countries.[14] A more prosperous Japan will also constitute a valuable world market. At the same time it can be expected that, if Japanese society undergoes a significant reorganization along progressive lines, the resulting higher standard of living will gradually raise the price levels of Japanese exports and markedly reduce the competition of cheap Japanese products.

SHOULD JAPAN LOSE ITS EMPIRE?

One of the most effective measures to prevent future Japanese aggression will be the break-up of the Japanese Empire. This means that Japan must lose all control not only over the territories conquered since 1937, but also over Formosa, seized in 1895 after war with China; Korea, which was annexed in 1910; the mandated Pacific islands, secured after Germany's defeat in World War I; and "Manchukuo" (consisting of Manchuria and parts of Inner Mongolia), taken from China in 1931-33. These territories have three things in common: they are all inhabited by non-Japanese populations; they have all suffered from Japan's harsh colonial policy; and they have all played a major role in Japanese expansion. Formosa is the site of important air and naval bases, a vital link in the naval chain connecting Japan with its southern empire. The Pacific Islands made possible the attack on Pearl Harbor. Korea and Manchuria are both important sources of war materials and contain significant war industries. The former served as a base for the seizure of Manchuria; the latter, in turn, was used as a springboard for the invasion of North China. Both are areas which can be used against the U.S.S.R., as shown by the fighting at Changkufeng on the Manchurian-Korean-Siberian frontier in 1938, and by innumerable conflicts, large and small, on the Manchurian-Siberian border. Moreover, Manchuria has long been the territorial base of one of the most aggressively militaristic groups in Japanese politics, the Kwantung Army. To deprive this organization of its main source of power and prestige is to strike a most serious blow at Japanese militarism.

12. Owen Lattimore, *America and Asia, Problems of Today's War and the Peace of Tomorrow* (Claremont, California, Claremont Colleges, 1943), p. 51.

13. Hu Shih, *Two Papers on Post-War Asia*, cited, p. 9.

14. William L. Holland, "War Aims and Peace Aims in the Pacific," *Pacific Affairs* (New York), December 1942, p. 426.

Although the abolition of Japanese authority in these territories is generally approved by writers on the subject, differences of opinion undoubtedly exist and may emerge more clearly as peace draws near. One commentator recommends that Japan receive a mandate for Korea after a specified interval.[15] Another declares that "Formosa should be included in the Chinese customs and currency system; but to make Formosa Chinese territory seems impolitic in view of the necessity for a United Nations base there."[16] A third suggests that, while Manchuria must be returned to China, the Chinese might be willing to agree to arrangements for only gradually ending Japanese economic interests in that area.[17]

These proposals appear to overlook the main issue. Although it is not our aim to subject Japan to unnecessary hardships, our primary concern will be to undermine Japanese militarism, to strengthen the bonds among the United Nations, and to establish an enlightened international order. To restore Japan as a colonial power, even on a small scale, would hardly be in keeping with our avowed objective of bringing about the liberation of nations. Nationalist sentiment among the Chinese of Manchuria and Formosa and the twenty-three million people of Korea is a living force that cannot be ignored by the peacemakers without creating grave problems for the future. The repercussions would be felt not only within these territories, but also in Free China, which deeply resents all proposals that would impair its sovereignty or prevent it from making full use of Japanese-developed economic facilities in Manchuria and Formosa for the reconstruction of ravaged areas.[18]

The best solution of the territorial problem will be the most clear-cut: the return of Manchuria and Formosa with all properties therein to full Chinese control, and the establishment of an independent state of Korea. The mandated islands, whose population is small, scattered, and without genuine nationalist feeling at the present time, might well be placed under United Nations administration, although sentiment will undoubtedly exist for American ownership. In either case, careful attention to the welfare of the inhabitants will be required, as well as steps toward their participation in government.[19]

The loss of its colonial empire will bring about what has been aptly called the "geographical disarmament" of Japan.[20] Without a continental foothold and island bases, the possibilities of aggression will be greatly reduced. It is worth recalling that the Japanese colonial network is the product of seventy-five years of careful planning, involving alliances with two major powers—first Britain and, in recent years, Germany. In view of the many changes that have occurred in the world since the rise of modern Japan, it is very doubtful whether Tokyo can start at the beginning and repeat the process.

SHOULD JAPAN PAY REPARATION?

The concept of reparation payments of a financial kind has been rather thoroughly discredited by Allied experience with Germany after World War I. Although it may be granted that the Germans did their utmost to make the system unworkable, it is also apparent that no country can pay large sums of money, especially under conditions of defeat, unless its export trade undergoes a tremendous expansion or it borrows abroad on a fantastic scale. With regard to reparation in kind, it was found in Europe that deliveries of industrial commodities sometimes aroused serious fears in the receiving nation that its own output of these articles would be reduced.[21]

Although the argument against reparation in money would seem to hold for Asia, the same objections do not exist there for payments in kind, since the countries that would receive reparation—such as China—do not have highly developed competitive industries. Consequently, in theory, Japanese deliveries of raw materials and finished products, instead of upsetting Chinese economy, might be extremely useful in the reconstruction of that country. Yet it is likely that the burden of reparation, even for a brief period, would be beyond the capacity of Japanese economy in view of the other difficulties confronting it. Moreover, if Japan is to develop along peaceful lines, it must receive an opportunity for a new start and not be strangled at the outset. It is therefore suggested that repara-

15. Byas, *Government by Assassination*, cited, pp. 359-60.

16. "The United States in a New World, II: Pacific Relations," supplement to *Fortune* (New York), August 1942, p. 11.

17. Sansom, *Postwar Relations with Japan*, cited, p. 3.

18. Unofficial Chinese sources have suggested that China might agree to the establishment of international bases on Formosa, provided that this territory is first returned unconditionally and that other nations show their willingness to make similar contributions to Pacific security. *New York Times*, May 16, 1943. *War and Peace in the Pacific* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), p. 37. Concerning Chinese fears that Manchuria may be given a special status, see "Why China Is Worried," *The Nation* (New York), May 15, 1943, p. 694.

19. Various proposals have been made concerning the disposition of the Liu Chiu islands (known also by the names of Lew Chew, Loo Choo, Ryu Kyu, and Okinawa), lying between Japan and Formosa. Originally tributary to China, they were taken over by Japan during the latter part of the last century. Some writers suggest that they be given to China; others, that they become an international base under a general security system.

20. Byas, *Government by Assassination*, cited, p. 351.

21. Vera Michel Dean, "What Future for Germany?" *Foreign Policy Reports*, February 1, 1943, p. 291.

tion consist solely of the surrender in each occupied area of such Japanese economic facilities as remain there after the devastation of war comes to an end.

SHOULD THERE BE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF JAPAN?

There is some sentiment in the United States for the post-war military occupation of Japan, chiefly in order to secure revenge or to "humiliate" the Japanese. Sometimes it is argued that humiliation will impress Japan with the futility of war and the high cost of failure. It appears more likely, however, that a policy carried through for the purpose of "rubbing in" the fact of defeat would produce increased hatred and intransigence on the part of the Japanese. This would be especially true if, as seems probable, they are beaten not through invasion of their own soil but as a result of defeats some distance from the homeland, combined with air attacks on the Japanese islands. In the latter event, occupation would be a deliberate act of policy following the enemy's unconditional surrender, rather than an inevitable part of the prosecution of the war. It is therefore necessary to see whether legitimate reasons for such a step exist.

Two possible reasons are the necessity of taking action against Japan's war criminals, and supervising the initial phases of Japan's temporary and partial disarmament. The former purpose could be achieved in a relatively short time—perhaps a few months—but control of disarmament would require a longer period. Yet, in view of the difficulties involved and the uncertainty of the results, it is doubtful whether occupation should last more than a year at most or have any other object than to pave the way for a new Japanese régime. Moreover, should a generally satisfactory Japanese government be established at the time of defeat or soon afterward, there will be little reason for foreign administration. If occupation does occur, it may well be limited to a few strategic centers, with its length, even in terms of weeks or days, related very intimately to the internal progress of the Japanese people in setting up a non-militaristic régime. It is also important that any occupation be directed clearly against Japan's militarists—not against the entire nation—and that there be no manifestation whatever of a spirit of revenge.

WITH WHOM SHOULD WE CONCLUDE PEACE?

Many differences of opinion exist concerning the groups in Japan with which the United Nations might conclude peace. Some observers argue that the Japanese Army and Navy should accept full responsibility for defeat by signing the peace treaty; others hold that a treaty should be signed only after the military elements have been removed from power.[22] The former are impressed by the view that the German republic, in signing the Treaty of Versailles, laid itself open to charges of weakness, treachery and lack of patriotism on the part of undemocratic groups, particularly the Nazis. While true, this explanation does not seem to touch the basic weakness of the Weimar government—the fact that it compromised fatally with internal enemies. The signing of the peace treaty, however unfavorable to Germany, would have had far less significance had the government possessed the will to break the militaristic Prussian caste control of the Army, to smash the Nazis, and to deal adequately with Germany's domestic problems.

Similarly, if a non-military government of Japan signs a peace treaty with the United Nations, a repetition of Weimar will not be inevitable if the new régime really goes to work and cleans out the militarists. Here a distinction must be made between the elements in Japan from which we can accept surrender and the type of government necessary for lasting peace. There is no reason to reject an armistice, i.e., the unconditional cessation of hostilities, from Tojo himself. In fact, this might be of some value in impressing the Japanese people with the failure of their militaristic leaders. But if Tojo and the militarists in general have previously been removed by the Japanese people, we will hardly insist on their restoration for the purpose of concluding an armistice. On the other hand, it would appear wise to sign a permanent treaty of peace only with a non-military régime that gives promise of following pacific policies. It may, of course, be argued that to conclude an armistice with Tojo or any other militarist would help his group to retain power, but history furnishes many examples of defeated governments that have passed from the scene even though they agreed to bring hostilities to an end. Besides, much will depend on whether the United Nations recognize that it is in their own interest to help anti-militaristic Japanese win control of policy. One method of extending such aid would be to punish the worst of the warmakers—inside or outside the armed forces—for the part they have played in aggression.[23] It would seem desirable to

22. Byas, *Government by Assassination,* cited, p. 345; Hillis Lory, *Japan's Military Masters: The Army in Japanese Life* (New York, Viking, 1943), p. 218; Holland, "War Aims and Peace Aims in the Pacific," cited, p. 424; *War and Peace in the Pacific,* cited, p. 42.

23. Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen and president of the Legislative Yuan of the Chinese government, has declared: "The officers of the Japanese Army have shown themselves brutal and cruel arch-criminals, and as a body they should be tried and dealt with. Above the rank of major generals they should be shot.

have a new Japanese government itself conduct, or at least participate in, the trial of war criminals, but if this is impractical the task will fall to the United Nations.

ARE THE JAPANESE PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR?

The degree of responsibility of the average Japanese for his country's aggressions will inevitably influence the peace program of the United Nations. Implicit in the preceding discussion—despite the severity of some of the terms proposed—has been the view that the Japanese people do not share equal guilt with their leaders, and that every effort must be made to create a gulf between the masses and the militarists in order to facilitate the development of a peaceful Japan. But a different view is frequently advanced—perhaps nowhere more vigorously than in this quotation: "Let us remember that here is no decent reasonable populace, exploited by a pack of militaristic gangsters, but seventy-five million madmen, all prepared to commit any crime at the behest of the State."[24]

Is this statement true? Undoubtedly the Japanese have in the main been pliant instruments of their militarists, and for this they will certainly pay during the war and after. Indeed, when one considers what Japan will face in suffering and internal reorganization, even the most sadistic observer need not fear that the people will escape feeling the disaster in their own lives. But have the Japanese in the mass really encouraged aggression by their leaders?

The view that they have is generally based on references to psychological or religious characteristics. It is said, for example, that "the Japanese, embittered by the many evidences of their inferior status among western nations and oppressed by fears for their national security, sought to overcome their feelings of inferiority by a spectacular drive for power which has culminated in the present war."[25] This is, in fact, a common theme, one author going so far as to speak of "the national inferiority complex which has reached the stage of a dangerous psychosis."[26] He declares in support: "the Japanese have been taught that they are the favored race of the earth. Yet they know that the rest of the earth laughs at their pretension of being the only divine residents of the globe. They know too that much of what is finest in their civilization has been borrowed from Korea, from China, and that all their present strength in industry and arms has been taken . . . from us in the Western world."

Quite properly, much stress has been placed on the role of Shinto, the national religion, in Japanese life and thought. According to this officially promoted doctrine, Japan is guarded by the deities, is of divine origin, and has a special mission in the world. Perhaps most significant—the Emperor is considered a divinity, to be worshipped by the people. These beliefs have been given wide circulation in the modern period, especially in the years since the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. As a result, according to an authority on the subject, Japan possesses "an emotional integration that cannot be duplicated the world over."[27] It is by such methods that the Japanese government promotes filial piety, loyalty to superiors, a chauvinistic love of country, and other characteristics useful to the state. Indeed, not only is Japanese life regimented by the government down to the smallest details,[28] but Japanese education is designed basically to produce a population "with sufficient knowledge to compete in the modern world, but not enough to question the ways of the governing groups."[29]

To sum up: it is certainly true that the Japanese are extremely nationalistic, that they are educated for loyalty and war, and that official Shinto promotes support of national aggressiveness. On the other hand, psychological explanations of Japan's actions confuse the picture by obscuring the concrete factors making for aggression. Although the people of Japan hold many unsound ideas, their shortcomings result not from neuroses or so-called "racial" characteristics, but from economic, social and political conditions.[30] Their views, like these conditions, are subject to change.

If the United Nations recognize this truth, they

Above the ranks of lieutenants they should be interned or imprisoned for life. The noncommissioned officers should be dispersed to other lands and given hard labor." "A Chinese Plan to Beat Japan Now," cited. His proposal that the highest leaders be shot is likely to be realized in large part under any satisfactory plan for dealing with those found guilty of serious war crimes, but it is possible that individuals in the lower ranks of army officers may change their views and join in the construction of a new Japan. The lower officers in many cases are of peasant origin and will probably be greatly influenced by the reaction of their civilian families to defeat. To punish them indiscriminately or as a group might deprive post-war Japan of some valuable leaders.

24. Simon Harcourt-Smith, *Fire in the Pacific* (New York, Knopf, 1942), p. 236.

25. Jesse F. Steiner, *Behind the Japanese Mask* (New York, Macmillan, 1943), p. 28.

26. Bradford Smith, "Japan: Beauty and the Beast," *Amerasia* (New York), April 1942, p. 89. A contrary view is presented by A. Grajdanzev, "Japan: Neither Beauty Nor Beast," *ibid.*, June 1942, pp. 175-76.

27. D. C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism: A Study of Present-Day Trends in Japanese Religion* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943), p. 9.

28. Helen Mears, *Year of the Wild Boar* (New York, Lippincott, 1942), p. 70.

29. John F. Embree, *The Japanese* (Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1943), pp. 24-25.

30. Lattimore, *America and Asia*, cited, p. 13.

will regard the Japanese people as human beings—in the mass neither savages nor neurotics—who have been harnessed to a brutal war machine.[31] A few have objected to what is being done by their rulers; many have actively approved; but it is probable that most have passively acquiesced. It is on their leaders that the main responsibility rests, since it is they who have had all power in their hands and have misused it. The Japanese people, in the grip of an outmoded social system, have never been consulted as to their wishes or permitted any genuine freedom of choice.

This does not mean that they should be excused for supporting the war machine any more than that they should be threatened with extermination. The one would provide no motive for abandoning their present course, while the other would drive them still closer to their rulers. Propaganda must be realistic and tough, telling the Japanese that there is an honorable place in the world for a peaceful Japan, but that the longer they fight the more difficult it will be for them to achieve that position.

WHAT PATH FOR A NEW JAPAN?

WILL JAPAN CRACK IN DEFEAT?

Although Japan's rulers have hitherto composed their differences through a policy of overseas expansion, serious disagreements may arise on the eve of defeat. The main question will then be whether a genuine split will occur among the country's leaders or whether they will manage to remain united until the end. The answer will be greatly influenced and perhaps determined by the reactions of the Japanese people, who may either become restive and demand peace, or fight until exhaustion, the slaves of ancient traditions and loyalties. Events alone can decide, but it seems unwise and unhistorical to assume that the morale of the Japanese is unbreakable, unless we believe that they are fundamentally different from all other peoples and, even under the severest strain, are not subject to the common patterns of human behavior.

The unwillingness so far of any significant number of Japanese to surrender on the battlefield is the result of several concrete conditions: powerful indoctrination against surrender, Japan's succession of victories over a period of years, and the fact that recent fighting in the southwest Pacific and the Aleutians has involved not mass armies but comparatively small bodies of men. If large Japanese armies—not picked troops—suffer major defeats, the old imperatives are likely to lose force, especially since in the later stages of the war manpower will be drawn increasingly from sources that are inferior both in physical stamina and indoctrination. Moreover, if Japan is plainly going to be beaten and perhaps undergo a change in régime, those who surrender will have the hope of returning home without being in disgrace. The Japanese of the future must therefore be viewed in the setting of defeat and not in the light of Japan's present position.

It is difficult to imagine the catastrophic effects of defeat on Japanese life—effects of such a nature as to shake the equanimity and resolve even of the sons of gods. Japan has never fought a war on the present scale—all its previous wars were against single, relatively weak opponents like Manchu China and Tsarist Russia—nor has it ever been beaten. It will not be surprising if the Japanese people develop reactions quite different from those of the past. Not only will demobilization of over two million soldiers produce enormous repercussions, but the outmoded structure of Japanese society is ill-prepared for close scrutiny in the clear light of defeat. That the rulers of Japan know this is attested to by their unceasing "dread of truth . . . a phenomenon found all over the world, but seldom in such strength and abundance as in modern Japan."[32] As far back as 1935, an American journalist observed that despite the country's seeming stability, "the leaders of this civilization were hysterical with anxiety."[33] What will the situation be after Tokyo and other cities have endured mass bombings and after Japan's forces have been steadily pressed back by superior arms? Quite possibly the war years that lie ahead will be more important in shaping the future mentality of Japan than the country's longer past of officially promoted loyalty and superstition.

Moreover, it is just as much of a mistake to ignore as to overemphasize the strains that have appeared in Japan in previous crises or to disregard tendencies in a non-militaristic direction. In 1918-19, for example, violent rice riots swept the country despite Japan's slight expenditure of effort in World War I and participation on the victorious side. It was "the changed current of thought outside Japan" that "encouraged the Japanese people. Militarist and reactionary policies were condemned everywhere."[34] Not only did Germany's defeat reduce the prestige of the armed forces, but America's stress on world democracy and war to end war had

31. Former Ambassador Grew has declared significantly: "No hint of Japan's massacre of Chinese civilians has been allowed to reach the Japanese people, so far as their censors have been able to prevent it." Grew, *Report from Tokyo*, cited, p. 57. Clearly Tokyo does not think its people would approve of the actions of the Imperial Army in conquered territory.

32. A. Morgan Young, *Imperial Japan, 1926-1938* (New York, Morrow, 1938), p. 249.

33. Mears, *Year of the Wild Boar*, cited, p. 292.

34. Koshi Katayama, "Is a Democratic Revolution Possible in Japan?" *Free World* (New York), March 1942, p. 129.

considerable influence. These factors were later reinforced by popular disillusionment over the costly fiasco of Japanese intervention in Siberia.[35]

During the twenties Japan experienced a very moderate development in the direction of democracy. Perhaps the high point in the parliamentary field was the overthrow of the militaristic Tanaka ministry in 1929 and its replacement by the Hamaguchi government which approved and secured Imperial ratification of the London Naval Treaty against the wishes of the Japanese Navy.[36] The forces of popular government, however, were too weak, especially since the police power of the state was constantly used against all democratic movements on the ground that they involved "dangerous thoughts."[37]

The invasion of Manchuria by decision of the military rather than the civil authorities was in a sense a *coup d'état* against the moderate progress of previous years. The changes that resulted were considerable, for "there was in 1927 an amount of independent civilian thinking which five years later it did not seem possible that there ever could have been."[38] Yet, that dissent continued after 1931 is evidenced by the popular distrust of militarist policies expressed in the elections of February 20, 1936 and April 30, 1937.[39] But each poll was followed by a military action that more than cancelled out the opposition sentiment: in the first case the "Young Officers'" revolt of February 26, 1936; in the second the invasion of China in July 1937. Since Pearl Harbor high Japanese leaders have made many statements indicative of internal discontent, for example, the declaration of the Home Minister in August 1942 that "opposing elements must be forcefully dealt with. . . ."[40] Even more significant is the recent ban on public assemblies not specifically arranged through the official propaganda agency.[41] In the light of all these facts it seems logical to conclude that, while Japan has never been a democracy, democratic or at least anti-militaristic tendencies have existed within the country.

35. Lory, *Japan's Military Masters,* cited, pp. 160-62.

36. Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (Garden City, Doubleday, Doran, 1935), pp. 283-336.

37. In 1928 the government, by Imperial Ordinance, extended the Peace Preservation Law to allow the death penalty instead of ten years' imprisonment for "dangerous thoughts." Young, *Imperial Japan,* cited, p. 37.

38. *Ibid.,* p. 26.

39. For an analysis of the strong anti-Fascist trend revealed in the election returns, see T. A. Bisson, *Japan in China* (New York, MacMillan, 1938), pp. 216-17, 266-67.

40. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, "Japan's Ideological Front," *Far Eastern Survey* (New York), May 3, 1943, p. 90. See also Joseph M. Bernstein, "The Myth of National Unity in Japan," *Amerasia,* April 25, 1943, pp. 66-72.

41. *New York Times,* August 12, 1943.

WHAT DIFFERENCES EXIST IN JAPAN?

Although the presence of democratic sentiment is worth noting, Japan may crack even if the democrats are in an infinitesimal minority. Circles strongly opposed to popular rule may at some critical point decide that it is impossible to continue under the existing leadership and policies. Indeed, nothing is more certain than that a movement to seek peace and to replace or modify the existing Japanese government would be the work of a heterogeneous coalition of conflicting interests. It may therefore be useful to describe some of the differences within Japan that can play a part in an internal breakdown once the country realizes the inevitability of defeat.

(1) *Big Business against the Militarists.* In the past all hopes for a break between these two groups have been dashed on the rocks of Japan's successful expansion. The alliance of the monopolies with the militarists will continue as long as the latter can show that their policy "works." But if Japan appears headed for disaster, will big business decide to cut loose and try to salvage what it can from the wreckage? A few years ago this might have seemed quite likely, but the all-out conversion from light to heavy industry in the past decade and the ever closer identification of leading financial-industrial interests with the Army since Pearl Harbor may have created a situation in which Japanese big business will prefer to risk utter defeat rather than voluntarily face the task of establishing a civilian economy. Under the circumstances, a split between big business and the militarists may be a consequence rather than a cause of defeat. Any differences that appear beforehand will, of course, be useful in breaking down Japanese resistance. But if the above analysis is correct, the United Nations can expect little from the great economic combinations that have been so closely identified with Japanese militarism[42] and will find it necessary, in fact, to curb these civilian associates of the warlords.

(2) *Big Business against the Landowners.* So far, big business and the landowners have worked in close partnership on the basis of semi-feudal agricultural conditions. This cooperation rests in part on the fact that the ancient virtues of loyalty and docility, and the overcrowding of the countryside, make it rather easy to keep land rents up and to secure cheap factory labor. Yet if Japanese society begins to crack and the peasants advance powerful demands for improved conditions, sections of big business, in an effort to make the best of a very difficult situation, may conclude that they have come to the parting of the ways with an outmoded

42. For further discussion of this relationship, see p. 156.

agricultural system. While such a decision would be reached only with the greatest reluctance, these circles might see in the modernization of agriculture the possibility of developing the internal market, which has hitherto been restricted because of the peasants' lack of purchasing power and resulting injurious effects on the general standard of living.

(3) *Emperor and Bureaucracy against the Militarists.* Although it is reported that the Emperor did not like the Tripartite Pact of 1940[43] and that his advisers have on many occasions shown displeasure at actions of the military, they have never offered serious opposition to aggression. In fact, the so-called liberal elements have supported all of Japan's wars and have almost invariably known how to "play ball with the Army."[44] But this does not necessarily mean that these groups are committed to the present militarist set-up to the point of self-destruction. If the assaults of the United Nations and the demands of the Japanese people are sufficiently compelling, the Imperial Household and the bureaucracy may support peace moves in an effort to save their own skins.

(4) *Small Business against Big Business.* The conflict between these groups is very intense, but so far the monopolies have had matters their own way, especially since the war has promoted cartellization and the eradication of small enterprise. Once defeat is certain, small business—i.e., what remains of it—may welcome steps to end the war in order to prevent complete extermination.

(5) *Military Circles against Each Other.* Despite the general tendency to emphasize Japanese unity, there is an abundance of evidence that many differences of opinion exist within the Army. Two especially striking actions were the assassination in 1935 of the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau by an officer of much lower rank, and the Army rebellion of February 1936, in which twenty-two officers and fourteen hundred men were involved.[45] The militarist factions, it is true, have remained united in victory but may not do so in defeat. Under the stress of military disaster, head-on clashes may develop between exponents of different economic and political philosophies in the Army, particularly since most of the troops are likely to be in mental and emotional turmoil. There is also much fuel for conflict in divisions between the Army and Navy.

(6) *Peasants against Landlords.* Despite the general docility of the Japanese peasants, they are capable of great violence. This was so under Tokugawa feudalism, when hundreds of peasant revolts occurred,[46] and it appears to be true today, even though conditions have changed. The violence and extremism of the "Young Officers" and many sections of the Army are attributable in part to links with the countryside. Nor can one overlook the frequent tenant disputes, especially over requests for rent reductions in poor harvest years.[47]

Such manifestations are a product of the severe oppression from which the Japanese peasant suffers. Although he may appear picturesque to the foreigner, he is often so poverty-stricken that he finds it necessary to sell his daughters into brothels. The figures show that in 1936 30.9 per cent of rural households consisted of independent owners, 27.1 per cent of tenants, and 42 per cent of part-tenants. Of the total farm area, 46.5 per cent was cultivated by tenants, and only 53.5 per cent by owners. Not only are Japanese farms extremely small, but rural indebtedness is high, as are rents, interest rates and the cost of artificial fertilizer, which is indispensable because of intensive cultivation. On the average, the tenant delivers more than half of his crop to the landlord and is given in return only the use of the land. The tenant generally supplies all implements, seeds and fertilizer, as well as his own dwelling, and pays all assessments except the land tax.[48]

During the war the burden on the peasantry has increased, but present difficulties are minor compared with what may happen later. It will not be surprising if, despite the feudal, paternalistic ideas prevalent in the countryside, the Japanese peasant then begins to stir and plays an important part in bringing the war to an end. Such a development is certainly necessary for future peace, since Japan can hardly be anything but an aggressor with its existing type of agricultural organization.[49]

(7) *Labor against Big Business.* Labor unions are now illegal in Japan, but even when they were permitted the Japanese labor movement was weak,

43. Joseph Newman, *Goodbye Japan* (New York, Fischer, 1942), pp. 194-96.

44. Sansom, *Postwar Relations with Japan*, cited, p. 2. Charles N. Spinks, "The Liberal Myth in Japan," *Pacific Affairs*, December 1942, pp. 450-56. Lory, *Japan's Military Masters*, cited, pp. 148-49.

45. See Lory, *Japan's Military Masters*, cited, chapter on "Army Factions."

46. Hugh Borton, "Peasant Uprisings in Japan of the Tokugawa Period," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* (Tokyo), Second Series, Vol. XVI, May 1938.

47. It is reported semi-officially that there were 4,000 tenant disputes in 1933; 5,828 in 1934; 6,824 in 1935; 6,804 in 1936; 6,170 in 1937; and 3,331 in 1938. K. J. Pelzer, "An Economic Survey of the Pacific Area," Part I: *Population and Land Utilization* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 119.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 116-19.

49. For further discussion of this point, see p. 156.

hardly accounting for as much as 10 per cent of the total number of factory workers.[50] The reasons for this weakness are easy to understand: the strongly nationalist, feudal ideas of many workers; government interference with and repression of labor activity; the existence of a large labor supply as the result of "overpopulation" in the countryside; the presence of many small shops that prevent the concentration of workers; and, not least important, the employment of large numbers of women, who are docile, temporary employees.[51] The results are seen in the unbelieveably low wages, long hours and bad working conditions prevalent in Japanese industry.[52]

It is likely that, if repressive measures cease, the labor movement will play an important role in national life. This is indicated by the development of labor parties in the twenties and thirties. The best-known of these was the *Shakai Taishuto* (Social Mass Party), which in 1936 increased its representation in the Diet from three seats to eighteen and rose to thirty-six in 1937. In the latter election it secured about 900,000 votes.[53] It is quite possible that, as the war crisis grows more intense, Japanese labor may become restive and demand peace.

(8) *Intellectuals and Young Aristocrats against an Outmoded Social Order.* A decade ago many students, despite the fact that their careers depended on the good-will of the authorities, were associated with anti-militaristic groups. More surprising was the appeal that liberal and radical doctrines held for younger members of noble families. This phenomenon can be explained only by the decadent state of Japanese society, which causes some intelligent individuals among the aristocracy to recognize the impossibility of maintaining the existing national structure. In the Japan of the future—just as in the France of 1789—some aristocrats may become supporters of far-reaching changes.

Moreover, there is evidence to support the view that in critical periods in Japanese history both the intellectuals and certain ruling elements have shown themselves extremely pragmatic in outlook: if a thing works, it must be good and worthy of careful, objective study. If it is absolutely clear—and the victory of the United Nations will make it so—that a combination of non-militaristic powers can defeat a bloc of the world's most aggressive, reactionary régimes, many of these Japanese, who have so far remained unconvinced, may see the point, namely, that aggression and the conditions that produce it lead not to power, but to catastrophe.

SHALL WE DEAL WITH THE EMPEROR?

The problem of the Imperial Household touches the very core of our attitude toward Japan's governmental structure. Those who argue that we must do nothing to impair the Emperor's prestige, maintain that in the future, as in the past, no régime can hope to function except in his name. It is also stated that the Emperor as an individual is a thrifty, methodical hard-working person,[54] who has been obliged to go along with the militarists, despite frequent disagreement with them. According to this view, although he is their puppet today, he may be equally suitable as a puppet of non-militaristic groups after Japan's defeat. Indeed, the belief is expressed that, under favorable conditions, Japan may develop "a more modern and democratic type of constitutional monarchy."[55] Not least important, it is suggested that the Emperor will be the most effective symbol of national unity and stability in the difficult post-war period.[56]

Those who object to dealing with the Emperor argue that his personal characteristics and inclinations are of little consequence, because the actual role of the Imperial Household since the Restoration has always been to sell the doctrines of militarism to the Japanese people. They hold that Emperor worship is the Japanese equivalent of Nazi racial doctrines. To the suggestion that the Japanese monarchy may repeat the constitutional development of the English royal house, they point out the many historical differences between the two countries. They deny that a figurehead of the militarists can with equal facility serve opposite masters, and fear that, if the Emperor is not deposed, the Army will retain its most powerful instrument in promoting the existing feudal spirit and aggressive mythology.[57]

In weighing these opposing views, it must be noted that the main question is whether the Japanese people will want the Emperor to remain at the close of the war—and only secondarily whether we will want him. If a majority of the people has

50. In the 1930's there were 350-400,000 organized workers out of a total of 4½ million workers in factories. Hugh Borton, *Japan Since 1931: Its Political and Social Developments* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p. 29.

51. Mears, *Year of the Wild Boar*, cited, pp. 287-89; W. H. Chamberlin, *Japan Over Asia* (Boston, Little Brown, 1937), p. 236.

52. Grew, *Report from Tokyo*, cited, p. 21.

53. Katayama, "Is a Democratic Revolution Possible in Japan?" cited, p. 130. A Communist party also exists in Japan, but its strength is difficult to judge since it has been illegal for many years.

54. Byas, *Government by Assassination*, cited, pp. 295-306.

55. Hu Shih, *Two Papers on Post-War Asia*, cited, p. 10.

56. Kenneth W. Colegrove, "What Shall We Do with the Japanese Emperor?" *Amerasia*, October 25, 1942, p. 379.

57. For some of these arguments, see *ibid.*, pp. 377-79; and Kate L. Mitchell, "The Political Function of the Japanese Emperor," *ibid.*, pp. 382-90.

lost faith in him, there will be every reason for us to welcome this change of opinion, since it is certainly true that he has played an important part in bolstering Japanese militarism. It would be strange for the United States, which has so often broken with the past in developing its own institutions, to consider it quite in order for the Japanese to retain an outmoded mythology on the ground that they are not capable of operating under rational political theories. Should the Japanese come to realize that the creed of the Emperor is outworn, they will probably also show the understanding needed to establish a functioning, modern governmental structure. The process will not be without its difficulties, but if the results point toward democracy and peace, temporary instability seems a small price to pay.

These considerations are all the more important since we do not know what role the Emperor will actually play in the future. It may be instructive to imagine a situation in which United Nations forces and personnel have been sent to a few strategic centers for occupation duties. Will these activities be carried out under the sole authority of the victorious powers, or will it be found necessary to secure the Imperial sanction? If the former, then will not the United Nations in effect be flouting the Emperor's prerogatives? If the latter, what will be done if the Emperor is unwilling to authorize all the actions considered desirable? These questions indicate the difficulties involved in advance decisions to maintain any of the institutions of an enemy country.

On the other hand, if the Japanese people continue to believe in the Imperial legend, it may be unwise for the United Nations to demand the Emperor's removal, since, in the last analysis, change must come from within Japan itself. All we can do—and this is likely to be far from negligible—is to encourage peaceful, democratic tendencies that already exist or may appear within the country. It is also worth noting that if the Emperor is largely a puppet, neither his presence nor absence can in itself be the primary factor in Japan's development. If he remains, everything will depend on whether there can come to power non-militaristic forces sufficiently strong to prevent him from again serving as a tool of the militarists. It would be dangerous to believe that the use of his name will make the development of popular movements in Japan unnecessary, especially since his own bias is certainly against the development of a genuinely democratic government. Our future relations with Japan can hardly be satisfactory if they depend on the outcome of a struggle between militarists and undemocratic court circles, with the mass of the people ignored, as they are at present.

A related problem is whether the United Nations should insist on changes in Japan's governmental structure, perhaps to the extent of including in the peace treaty clauses curbing the military or increasing the powers of the parliament. If we do this, it is asked, what will become of Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter which respects "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live"? President Roosevelt has already dealt with this question in the following statement, made on February 12, 1943: "No nation in all the world that is free to make a choice is going to set itself up under a Facist form of government, or a Nazi form of government or a Japanese warlord form of government. For such forms are the offspring of seizure of power followed by the abridgement of freedom .... the United Nations can properly say to these forms of government two simple words: 'Never again.' For the right of self-determination included in the Atlantic Charter does not carry with it the right of any government anywhere in the world to commit wholesale murder or the right to make slaves of its own people or of any other peoples in the world."[58]

Although this statement clarifies the moral aspect of the problem, it does not follow that it will be possible to wipe out specific features of the régime by treaty. To write clauses requiring that the Emperor be deposed, the Constitution revised, or official Shinto abolished would be to assume that historically rooted institutions can be destroyed by formal agreement. It seems more sound to adopt a policy of letting the Japanese know by our actions and words how we feel about particular practices, especially since a defeated government in Toyko will probably be highly sensitive to the opinions of the victorious powers. A British diplomat and student of Japan has put the matter cogently in the suggestion that we will "require a nice mixture of persuasion and coercion which will have to be compounded by skilled hands."[59]

WILL JAPAN HAVE A REVOLUTION?

It is impossible to predict the post-war attitudes of the Japanese people: defeat may be attributed to the evil policies of militarism, or may be excused on the ground that Germany cracked up, the United Nations were too strong, and individual Japanese leaders made mistakes. Whether marked changes take place and, if so, by relatively peaceful evolution or by revolution, is a matter that the Japanese

58. *New York Times*, February 13, 1943.
59. Sansom, *Postwar Relations with Japan*, cited, p. 16.

will decide for themselves. Yet, it would be well for Americans to understand that the housecleaning necessary for the rise of a peaceful, democratic Japan will be a far-reaching one in all branches of life and government. So far, no nation in modern history has succeeded in destroying feudal or semi-feudal conditions in the countryside without passing through a period of civil war. Moreover, the ideas of democracy, which are taken for granted in the United States, are of a revolutionary character in a country like Japan.[60]

WHAT CAN WE DO FOR JAPAN?

There is no doubt that the United Nations can do much to aid the Japanese in building a new future, as indicated in this REPORT. A great deal depends of course, on what Tokyo does, since it is not in the interest of the United Nations to help create a new militaristic Japan. On the other hand, we should not expect too little of the Japanese nor should we, for lack of faith, act in such a way as to discredit new, untried leaders in favor of seemingly "respectable" elements connected with the present disaster in the Pacific. It will also be essential to develop some type of international organization —preferably of a global character with a sub-council for Asia — that will as soon as practicable include Japan. It can serve little purpose at present to attempt to describe such an organization in detail, particularly since the set-up may be determined largely by developments occurring in Europe before Japan's defeat. Yet it is clear that a world and regional association can be very helpful in dealing with economic and political questions, and that its handling of tariff and trade matters may prove important in the development of a peaceful Japan.[61] This is all the more true, since—if there is to be peace in Asia—Japan on the morrow of defeat will have to find an effective alternative to its present war economy. To discover this new road will be the responsibility not only of the Japanese, but also of the nations that have defeated them.

60. A statement by a number of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London presents an interesting group of possibilities for post-war Japan: "(1) Retention of the Emperor with a 'liberal' entourage; restoration of the power of the Diet, and 'strong' government with the participation of certain military leaders to suppress disorder; great influence of elderly political figures such as Matsudaira, Wakatsuki, Machida, Ugaki.

"(2) Removal of the Imperial dynasty and establishment of a democratic republic; this would mean a trend to the Left and the emergence of younger men, but the new régime, like the Weimar Republic of Germany, would still be in conflict with more extreme revolutionary forces and would have to invoke the aid of military units which it might not be able to control.

"It is possible, however, that all attempts to maintain the existing social structure may fail. There may be a violent social revolution sweeping away all the existing upper classes and plunging Japan into prolonged and devastating civil war. It is hardly profitable to speculate on the course of such a revolution or the forms it might assume, but there is certainly material for such a conflagration in Japan if there were a real breakdown of economic [organization] and of constituted authority." *Problems of the Post-War Settlement in the Far East* (A), *A Preliminary Survey* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1942), p. 10.

61. Discussions of the problems of Pacific organization will be found in Chow, "The Pacific After the War," cited, pp. 82-85; and *War and Peace in the Pacific*, cited, pp. 13-15, 78-80, 82-85.

Why Is Japan an Aggressor?

BY LILLIAN G. AND LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

It is frequently asserted that Japan has always been an aggressor; but investigation reveals that, although the roots of militarism go deep into the country's history, the effective causes of modern aggression arise largely from Japanese society as it has been shaped since the revolution of 1868.[1] Previously Japan had a feudal social order, and the land was divided into the territories of various clans, controlled by feudal lords with the support of warrior retainers called *samurai*. The chief feudal lord —the leader of the Tokugawa clan—was, in effect, the supreme ruler of the country, although there was an Emperor who theoretically held power. The reins of government lay in Tokugawa hands from 1603 to 1868 but, long before Perry knocked at the door, the régime was disintegrating from within. The effect of Western intervention was to hasten

1. The following summary of the causes and effects of the revolution of 1868—known also as the Meiji Restoration—is based largely on E. Herbert Norman's *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

the decline of Japanese feudalism and to distort the process, since the swiftness of transition allowed no time for genuine development of a popular, anti-feudal movement.

Japanese feudalism was breaking up because Japanese society had changed. A rising merchant class sought political recognition; the peasantry, extremely discontented, resorted increasingly to local revolts; feudal lords and their warriors were alarmed at the steady growth of their debts to the merchants; and four of the leading clans, long enemies of the ruling Tokugawa group, saw an opportunity to unseat it. The régime, moreover, had for more than two centuries kept Japan in virtual isolation, with almost all overseas trade and foreign contacts forbidden. Such a policy, while possible under a purely feudal society, became outmoded with the rise of merchant enterprise. The result was the overthrow of the Tokugawa government in the name of the Emperor by a broad coalition of *samurai,* feudal lords, court circles, merchants and peasants. Abandoning many of the institutions of feudalism, the new régime established private property in land, reorganized the system of taxation, and introduced industrialization, modern armaments, and conscription.

These changes were all handed down from above. Unquestionably the new policies were often progressive in character and enabled Japan to insure its national survival; but they were carried through in such a way as to prevent democratic internal development and preserve much of the country's feudal traditions. What occurred was not a popular revolution, but the kind of compromise between powerful feudal circles and a growing, but still weak, merchant class that marked the rise of modern Germany.

It is the survival of elements of feudalism that explains the so-called "façade" of modern Japan. Actually there is only one Japan, but it has two aspects: it is modern in armaments and much of its industrial production, but semi-feudal in its agriculture, social hierarchy and Shinto mythology. Neither alone is the reality; the two together—opposite sides of the same coin—form a society full of menace to its own people and the world. The leaders of the post-Restoration period wished to make Japan strong by taking over the techniques of industrial society while suppressing any content of liberalism and democracy. Thereby they hoped to secure for themselves a combination of the power of the modern world and the popular docility of an earlier age.

Role of the Army. Japan was modernized primarily under military auspices. Not only were certain clan military bureaucrats in the forefront of the new leadership, but government personnel was predominantly of warrior origin. From 1895 until his death in 1922 Marshal Yamagata of the former Choshu clan was the dominant figure in Japanese politics, and he initiated the selection of War and Navy Ministers, respectively, from the ranks of generals and lieutenant-generals, or admirals and vice-admirals on the active list. By this method, the militarists controlled the actions of party governments, since the willingness of the armed forces to allow the necessary men to serve determined whether a Cabinet could be formed, or survive after its formation. Moreover, until the 1920's Japan was ruled predominantly by men who had once belonged to the Satsuma and Choshu clans, with the former playing the main part in developing the Navy and the latter the Army.[2]

It is true that after World War I Army prestige momentarily sank so low that "officers changed into civilian clothes when appearing in public, rather than feel uncomfortably conspicuous in uniform."[3] And in 1931 high military officers feared that popular opinion might force the opening of the War and Navy Cabinet posts to civilians,[4] thereby depriving the military of direct access to the Emperor —one of the prerogatives of these Ministers. But with the attack in Manchuria, the Army kicked over the traces, demonstrating that it could initiate major military actions without consulting the Cabinet. Thereafter, by force as well as propaganda, it increasingly strengthened its position at home.

Japanese Big Business. Just as Japan is unique among the powers in the supremacy of the military over the civil authority, so it differs from other nations in its exceptional concentration of industry. The dominance of the "Big Four"—the houses of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda—has no true parallel in any other major country. These great enterprises controlled perhaps 60 per cent of all Japanese joint-stock capital in 1938. In 1937 Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo together conducted about a third of Japan's foreign trade. The four houses were the leaders of finance, trade and industry and, through their power over credit, markets and prices, dominated other large and small concerns.[5] After 1931 they played a major role in the development of a new heavy industry that

2. *Ibid.,* pp. 70, 83; Tanin and Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan* (New York, International Publishers, 1934), p. 175; Robert Karl Reischauer, *Japan: Government—Politics* (New York, Nelson, 1939), pp. 91-92, 107-10. In 1913 the ranks of those eligible for the War and Navy posts were extended to include generals, admirals, etc., on the reserve list.

3. Hillis Lory, *Japan's Military Masters: The Army in Japanese Life* (New York, Viking, 1943), p. 160.

4. *Ibid.,* p. 127.

5. Robert A. Brady, *Business as a System of Power* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943), pp. 90-98.

overshadowed the light industry previously characteristic of Japan.[6]

All disagreements between big business and the armed forces were subordinated in a common unity, especially since differences related more to tempo than to fundamental policy. One reason for this fundamental harmony is indicated by the remark of an American observer, that "one can scarcely go into any corner of the Japanese Empire, however remote, without finding one of the big capitalist combines firmly entrenched and skimming the cream of whatever profits are to be made."[7]

Agriculture and War. The manner in which the Restoration leaders dealt with agricultural conditions has had much to do with Japanese aggression. In contrast with the France of 1789—where the nobility lost its estates without compensation and the land was auctioned off to landlords and peasant proprietors—the Japanese territorial lords became financial magnates, using the government bonds that they received in compensation for their feudal revenues to make investments in banks, stocks, industries or land. No effort was made to create a genuinely modern agriculture, and many remnants of feudalism survived, such as a very backward agricultural technique, excessively high rents and the division of land into extremely small units. There was also a steady rise in tenancy. These conditions lie behind Japan's so-called overpopulation, which is not an absolute surplus of people but a relative surplus in relation to the existing organization of land and industry.

Government and the War. The Emperor, his counselors, and the parliament have also figured in political developments. The Emperor's advisers are the leading members of what is known as the "bureaucracy," a body of appointed civil officials in political and economic posts, who perform an important function in national life by reconciling the differences between militarists and big business at the same time that they supply the technical knowledge necessary for the armed forces to carry through their policies.[8] The Emperor, supreme in name, is in large part a figurehead, but not completely so. His advisers, although frequently attacked by extremists before Pearl Harbor for attempting to restrain the Army, yielded whenever matters came to a crisis.

In 1889 the Emperor granted a Constitution, and the following year a Japanese Diet, or parliament, came into operation. But the new political system, while designed to silence the demands of internal opponents and to establish Japan as a modern state in the eyes of the world, bore only a superficial resemblance to democracy. The Constitution was "conceived in a spirit of benevolent autocracy" and remained "the inflexible instrument of absolutism,"[9] as is indicated by the fact that the Emperor alone can initiate amendments and that no amendments have ever been made.[10]

The most important matters of state can be dealt with by Imperial ordinance, without genuine consultation of the Diet, if it is so decided. Moreover, the Emperor can declare war, make peace, conclude treaties, and establish martial law. The upper house of the Diet, the House of Peers, is an aristocratic body consisting chiefly of members of the nobility, and is completely beyond popular control. The lower House, or House of Representatives, has been elected since 1928 by universal manhood suffrage of those 25 years of age or older. One of its main features is an extremely weak budgetary power—similar to that of Bismarck's ineffective Reichstag, after which it was modeled.[11] As for the major political parties that existed until a few years ago—even in their heyday they were not instruments of popular sentiment but largely corrupt factional groupings closely linked with the big monopolies, especially Mitsui and Mitsubishi.

It is apparent from the above discussion of Japanese society that aggression is the natural fruit of so misshapen a social, political and economic order. It will be of little use to indict one or another militarist as the guilty one, or to blame the militarists alone and exonerate their civilian accomplices. To do so would be to allow the seeds of future wars to lie undisturbed in the soil of Japan's national life.

6. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, "Japan's Economy Since Pearl Harbor: Part I," *Far Eastern Survey* (New York), June 14, 1943, pp. 119-23.

7. W. H. Chamberlin, *Japan Over Asia* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1937), p. 228.

8. Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State,* cited, pp. 134, 205-206. See also Minoru Uchida, "Japan as a Totalitarian State," *Amerasia* (New York), May 1938, pp. 133-36.

9. Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State,* cited, p. 188.

10. Reischauer, *Japan: Government—Politics,* cited, p. 77.

11. *Ibid.,* pp. 78-79, 81, 84-85, 94-95.

In the September 15 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

INTER-AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION *by Ernest S. Hediger*